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Abstract Understanding the dynamics or sequences of
animal behavior usually involves the application of either
dynamic programming or stochastic control methodolo-
gies. A difficulty of dynamic programming lies in inter-
preting numerical output, whereas even relatively simple
models of stochastic control are notoriously difficult to
solve. Here we develop the theory of dynamic decision-
making under probabilistic conditions and risks, assuming
individual growth rates of body size are expressed as a
simple stochastic process. From our analyses we then
derive the optimization of dynamic utility, in which the
utility of weight gain, given the current body size, is a
logarithmic function: hence the fitness function of an
individual varies depending on its current body size. The
dynamic utility function also shows that animals are uni-
versally sensitive to risk and display risk-averse behaviors.
Our result proves the traditional use of expected utility
theory and game theory in behavioral studies is valid only
as a static model.
Keywords Dynamic decision-making  Stochastic
environment  Foraging behavior  Risk sensitivity 
Expected utility theory
Introduction
Environmental uncertainty and risk are critical factors
modulating behavioral sequences in animals. Extensive
empirical studies of foraging behavior demonstrate animal
behavior is highly risk-sensitive (Real and Caraco 1986;
Stephens and Krebs 1986; Stephens et al. 2007; Houston
et al. 2011). Mathematical approaches used frequently in
traditional studies of foraging behavior include (1) the
mean-variance or variance-discount method (Stephens
1981; Stephens and Charnov 1982; Stephens et al. 2007);
(2) expected utility theory (Caraco 1980; Real 1980a,
1980b). These two methods are highly effective for char-
acterizing and comparing decision-making processes under
conditions of uncertainty and have been applied often in
the interpretation of behavior in experimental settings.
However, they are not easily applicable towards elucidat-
ing the sequence of behavioral decisions or dynamic
decision-making.
Optimizing behavior under the constraints of uncertainty
and risk often depends on the precise sequence of behav-
ioral decisions or dynamic decision-making. Mathematical
approaches towards optimizing dynamic decision-making
include dynamic programming (DP) (Bellman 1957) and
stochastic optimal control (Pontryagin et al. 1962). Since
its introduction to behavioral ecology, dynamic program-
ming has been extensively applied to optimality analyses of
behavior and life history strategies (Houston and McNa-
mara 1982; Mangel and Clark 1986, 1988; Houston et al.
1988). Moreover, dynamic programming has proved useful
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in evaluating the lifetime reproductive success (Darwinian
fitness) in the development of individual-based models
(Judson 1994).
In contrast, stochastic control theory has only rarely
been applied to behavioral and evolutionary ecology (see
e.g., Katz 1974; Oaten 1977; Oster and Wilson 1978). This
is mainly because of the difficulty and intractability of
Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the core principle of
stochastic control theory (Stephens and Krebs 1986;
Mangel and Clark 1988). Further, the applicability of this
approach to behavioral biology is rather limited owing to
its complexity and the numerous, possibly unrealistic,
assumptions inherent in it.
Apart from some additional assumptions of continuous
variables (Mangel and Clark 1988), stochastic control
theory is mathematically equivalent to dynamic program-
ming, but the latter is more powerful and flexible when
applied to dynamic decision-making in behavioral and life
history analyses (Mangel and Clark 1986; Houston et al.
1988). The essence of dynamic programming is Bellman’s
principle of optimality (Bellman 1957, 1961), which states
that in a multistage decision process, the series (sequence)
of optimal choices always consists of the optimal choice at
each time step.
In spite of the wide applicability and usefulness of
dynamic programming in behavioral and evolutionary
ecology, there is a weak point in this method: the difficulty
in the interpretation of numerical results. In dynamic pro-
gramming, the output is always in the form of numerical
tables summarizing dynamic changes of animal behavioral
states: characterizing optimal behavior is not straightfor-
ward. Therefore, great care must be exercised in the
interpretation of numerical values representing optimal
behavioral sequences. In some complicated cases, such
interpretation is impossible or nearly so, because of com-
plex model settings. In spite of its limitations, dynamic
programming has remained the most useful approach for
exploring dynamic problems in behavioral and evolution-
ary ecology, since stochastic control theory is much more
limited in its applicability (Mangel and Clark 1988).
Here we develop an analytical model of dynamic deci-
sion-making under uncertainty and risks by applying the
mathematical analyses (techniques) developed in prior
studies of geometric mean fitness (Yoshimura and Clark
1991), within the framework of dynamic utility maximi-
zation (Strotz 1955). We argue that this is the first method
to characterize properties of fitness in a dynamic sense, in
which the fitness function (optimization criterion) changes
dynamically in time. In this paper, the mathematical
technique developed for geometric mean fitness in sto-
chastic environments (Yoshimura and Clark 1991) is
applied to the optimization of sequential decisions of an
individual animal. We should note here that the
mathematics we develop for behavioral decision-making is
at the individual level within a single generation, and
highly distinct from that of geometric mean fitness
approximating population growth over many generations.
For example, the risk of predation of an individual within
one generation is different from that of stochastic variation
over many generations (Ito et al. 2013).
We consider the optimization of daily sequential deci-
sions from birth to death of an individual and evaluate its
lifetime reproductive success. We consider the optimality
of a stochastic decision process by applying Bellman’s
principle of optimality used in dynamic programming
(Bellman 1957, 1961). We solve the optimal decision
sequence analytically. The result shows that the fitness
function (optimal decision criterion) is dependent on cur-
rent animal states. Finally we discuss the implications of
the result, especially for game theory.
Theory
Suppose that a juvenile animal grows every day to adult-
hood. Body size, wt, is the non-negative state variable of
the animal (decision-maker) at time t for t = 0,…,T, where
T  0 is a finite end time (until death). We may regard
body size as a proxy for the energy state or fat reserves of
an animal. Note that T corresponds to the time of repro-
duction in semelparous animals, e.g., anadromous salmon.
For simplicity, we assume that the final body size, wT,
represents the potential fitness (lifetime reproductive suc-
cess of an individual animal).
Let rt (C0) denote the multiplicative growth rate of body
size at time t, such that wt?1 = rtwt. Then the body size, wt,
is expressed:




Note that, at each time t, the decision-maker chooses an
option that results in a growth rate rt, where rt is given by the
probability distribution of growth rates associated with the
option. Then the growth rate rt (t = 0,…,T) is a stochastic
process, and the decision-maker can optimize this stochastic
process by choosing an option at each time point. We here
evaluate the optimality of sequential decisions over
t = 0,…,(T - 1) (decision sequence of totalling T
decisions). Then the geometric mean G(r) of the body size








The above Eqs. (1, 2) are similar to those of geometric
mean fitness at the population level (Yoshimura and Clark
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1991), but differ by incorporating multiple decisions of an
individual over its lifetime (at the individual level).
We assume that the multiplicative growth factors rt
(t = 0,1,2,… ,T) of the body size of an animal are inde-
pendent and identically-distributed random variables
(i.i.d.r.vs.). Here Eq. (2) is the average of observed growth
factors rt evaluated over time t. In order to analyze the
optimality of decision sequences, we replace rt with the
corresponding probability distribution p = p(r) (i.e.,
probability p(rj) = 1/t), such that
G rð Þ ¼
Y
rpðrÞ ð3Þ
Note this equation includes a probability distribution
which can be interpreted as an ensemble average estimated
by a large number of trials with many individuals. Now the






Then we consider the optimization of the body size of an
individual until time t, such that
Maximize : wt ð5Þ
for all the decisions over j = 0,…,(t - 1). In this paper we
call this estimate of reproductive success the potential
fitness (of an individual animal). Maximizing wT (i.e.,
t = T) yields the optimization of body size over an
individual’s lifetime. This framework is identical to the
principle of optimality in dynamic programming (Bellman
1957, 1961). From Eq. (4), maximizing the potential fitness
(Eq. 5) becomes simply: max {wt} = w0{max G(r)}
t. Then
the maximization of the geometric mean potential fitness
G(r) is achieved by maximizing log{G(r)}, since log(r) is a
monotone increasing function. Thus maximizing potential
fitness wt (Eq. 5) is equivalent to maximizing log{G(r)},
such that







¼ Eflog rg; ð6Þ
where E now refers to the commonly used arithmetic mean,
in this case of log r. This expression ties in nicely with
utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947).
Namely we simply define a utility function u(r):
u rð Þ ¼ log rð Þ ð7Þ
and then express our evolutionary hypothesis as ‘natural
selection maximizes expected utility E(u(r)) of growth rate
r.’ Since log r is universally concave downwards, we reach
the immediate prediction that the utility maximization
under conditions of uncertainty is, in principle, risk averse
(Mangel and Clark 1988, Yoshimura and Clark 1991).
Finally the growth rate r of body size can be replaced by
weight gain g and current body size w at any time. Since
rt = wt?1/wt and wt?1 = (gain at time t) ? wt, we get
r ¼ g þ w
w
ð8Þ
We then define the dynamic utility surface u(g;w) of
gain g (decision variable) given current body size w (state
variable), such that:




and the principle of dynamic utility (DU) optimization is to
maximize the expected utility (potential fitness) E(u(g; w))
of weight gain g, given current body size w (Fig. 1). Thus,
given a current state w, the static solution of dynamic
utility becomes a simple form of the expected utility theory
with a logarithmic utility function of gain g given w. This
result demonstrates that the potential fitness function itself
(optimization criterion or utility function) depends on the

























Fig. 1 Dynamic utility function, u = u(g;w). a, u plotted against g b,
u plotted against (g ? w). Body sizes are w = 1 (solid line), 2
(dashed line), 3 (dotted line)
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Discussion
Previously, fitness has been considered a universal function
of a single variable w (body size, food, energy or fat
reserves), e.g., the utility function u = u(w) (Caraco 1980;
Real 1980a, b). However, it has been pointed out in human
economic behavior that the shape of the utility function
should depend on the current wealth state (Friedman and
Savage 1948; Markowitz 1952). Our analysis demonstrates
that the shape of the fitness function (potential fitness of an
individual) also depends on two variables: one state vari-
able (e.g., current body size) and one decision variable
(current gain), i.e., u = u(g; w) (Eq. 9, Fig. 1a). This
indicates that potential fitness functions can vary among
individual animals as long as their current states (e.g., body
size) vary as well (Fig. 1b).
The current result does not agree with the properties of
the utility function in a payoff matrix under game theory
(e.g., Maynard Smith 1989). For example, consider the
payoff matrix of the famous hawk-dove game (Fig. 2).
When a dove plays with a dove, they divide the fitness
reward, V/2. Suppose the body size of one dove (dove 1) is
ten times that of the other dove (dove 2), i.e., w1 = 10w2.
Then, the equal fitness value (V/2) means that the gain of
dove 1 is ten times that of dove 2, i.e., g1 = 10g2. This
implies that the larger one will receive proportionately
more food than the smaller one. For example, if there is
110 g of food in total, dove 1 gets 100 g, while dove 2 gets
10 g. This contrasts with the peaceful (equal) division of
rewards (55 g each) among doves unless all doves have an
equal body size. However, once the game is played among
hawks and doves, the body sizes of the players become
distinct. The weight w of the dove against a dove becomes
w ? V/2, whereas that of the dove against a hawk remains
w. In similar fashion, the hawk body size varies as well.
The hawk versus hawk becomes w ? (V - C)/2, while the
hawk versus dove becomes w ? V. Thus, once the game
has begun, the current body sizes of players become highly
variable. In the payoff matrix that is derived from the
traditional utility theory, the current w does not affect the
utility function from the third axiom (so called indepen-
dence axiom) of expected utility theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1947). Thus our result shows that the third
axiom is not valid for dynamic behavior in principle. We
thus conclude that the expected utility theory is a static
model.
In reality, for an animal player with a full stomach, the
reward V has close to zero utility, but for a starved animal,
it has a considerably higher utility, irrespective of the
players being hawk or dove. It follows that the reward v is
the actual gain (food or energy gain in animals and money
in humans), instead of its utility. This means that the
reward is the same for all players in the payoff matrix, but
the utility of a player depends on the current state (body
size or energy reserve) of the player.
Dynamic utility is useful in characterizing behavioral
dynamics because its outcome is analytical. Thus it over-
comes the limitations of dynamic programming generating
only numerical outputs. The analytical solution of dynamic
utility derives from the assumption of the multiplicative
growth rate r as a stochastic process. However, in analyses
of dynamic utility we cannot apply individual environ-
mental parameters used by dynamic programming (or the
equivalent stochastic control).
Our analysis proves that the dynamic optimality (opti-
mization criterion) always depends on current states of
animals. This indicates that the mean-variance methods
and expected utility theory are static models referring to a
decision of an individual at one time point (Mangel and
Clark 1988; Houston et al. 2011). Dynamic utility is a new
addition to the two existing dynamic optimization methods
for analyzing animal behavior: dynamic programming and
stochastic control.
Most empirical studies of foraging suggest animals
exhibit risk-averse behaviors (Caraco and Chasin 1984;
Yoshimura and Shields 1987; Ito et al. 2013). Note that the
derived dynamic utility function (logarithm of gains)
implies a diminishing return of gains. This means that
optimal behavioral decisions are universally risk-averse.
However, risk-prone behavior has also been observed in
some empirical studies in a variety of animal species,
including insects (Moses and Sih 1998), fish (Sih 1994),
squirrels (Bowers and Breland 1994), chimpanzees (Gilby
and Wrangham 2007) and humans (Codding et al. 2011).
The theory of dynamic utility is an important and basic
principle of dynamic decision-making and merits further
theoretical and empirical contributions.
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Fig. 2 Typical payoff matrix of a hawk-dove game. Dynamic utility
indicates that each payoff should not be a utility, but an absolute gain
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